Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 1
THE FOURTH ANNUAL ABRAHAM L.
POMERANTZ LECTURE: Tensions Between
Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: An
International Perspective

Article 4

1-1-1991

Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance
Bevis Longstreth

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 113 (1991).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol57/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

REFLECTIONS ON THE STATE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Bevis Longstreth*
To judge from the wealth of recent writings and symposia
on the subject, corporate governance, and in particular, the role
of the institutional investor therein, has become the new "hot"
topic among academics (Richard M. Buxbaum, Ronald J. Gilson
and Reinier Kraakman, Louis Lowenstein, George W. Dent, Jr.),
lawyers (Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum and A.A. Sommer, Jr.), businessmen (Elmer Johnson) and institutional investors (CalPERS).
Most commentators attribute this renewed interest in corporate governance to the takeover battles of the 1980s. Certainly
there is a connection between the two. In the struggle for corporate control that dominated the corporate landscape throughout
that decade, tremendous resources were devoted to both offense
and defense in what became for many of those involved a highly
personalized matter of corporate life and death. Indeed, the vocabulary, now so well known, underscored the life threatening
aspect of these encounters: "poison pills," "shark repellents,"
"golden parachutes," "PAC man defenses."
One excess begat another.
The growth in hostile takeover bids, sometimes using coercive two-tier offers, sometimes pitting a notorious corporate
raider bent on bust-up against a well-regarded management,
sometimes using very high leverage through the use of junk
bonds, thereby endangering the future health of the target, encouraged a vigorous response on behalf of management. Management's counterattack led to a number of developments:
1. Delaware and other states approved the elimination of liability for breach of the duty of care.
2. At least twenty-nine states adopted second generation antitakeover laws, designed to avoid direct conflict with the Wil* Partner, Debevoise & Plinpton, New York City. B.S.E. Princeton University 1956,
J.D. Harvard Law School 1961. Member, S.E.C. 1981-84.
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liams Act by regulating corporate rights and powers typically defined by state law, thereby skirting the 1982 Edgar v. MITE
Corp.1 decision, where the Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois
anti-takeover law on Commerce Clauise grounds.
3. Poison pills were widely approved by the courts, despite
the perception that they had adverse effects on shareholders, as
evidenced by directors' unwillingness to seek shareholder approval. Over 1,200 corporations adopted poison pills without
consulting shareholders.
4. Beyond these changes, and far more significant in their
ability to lessen market forces as a check on management, were
(1) the application of the business judgment rule to takeover situations, and (2) the emergence of state laws permitting directors
to consider nonshareholder constituencies as a basis for taking
action.
The effectiveness of management's counterattack is suggested by the steady decline over the past decade in the percentage of tender offers that were hostile, from a high of 43% in
1982 to 21% in 1989 and a low of 10% in 1990 (through
November).
In response to these developments a few institutional investors, most prominently CalPERS, the largest publicly funded retirement system in the country with assets of $55 billion, sought
to use their voting power to dissuade managements from adopting defensive measures that tended to make their corporations
bid-proof. CalPERS also sought to gain management acceptance
of the "shareholder advisory committee" idea, this being a committee representing a corporation's largest shareholders, formed
to meet regularly with management to receive and react to management's reports on its performance. CalPERS succeeded in
the case of Lockheed, where management agreed to a shareholders advisory committee in order to win institutional support in
its proxy contest with Harold Simmons.
This was roughly the state of play when the junk bond market died, and with it, the takeover era. Unfortunately, the corporate battlegrounds on which the takeover wars were fought remain strewn with the implements of war-the excesses of the
eighties. The detritus of these wars may well affect corporate

1

457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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performance for some time to come. This may help to explain
why now, with the subduing effects on the marketplace of a
global recession, comes a torrent of writing about corporate governance and the institutional investor.
A common belief underlying much of this writing is that
corporations will function better if shareholders are given enhanced voice.
Professors Louis Lowenstein and George Dent would turn
over the nominating machinery for directors to shareholders.
Professor Lowenstein proposes to give shareholders the exclusive
right to nominate one-fifth to one-quarter of the board. Professor Dent would go much further, giving the corporation's ten to
twenty largest shareholders exclusive access to the proxy machinery at corporate expense.
Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman seek to
create a group of "professional directors," selected by a clearinghouse and approved by enough institutional investors to assure
election, either through a proxy fight or by the cooperation of an
intimidated management. They suggest that about.25 percent of
the board be so elected.
CalPERS would have corporations create the shareholder
advisory committees earlier described.
And Marty Lipton and Steve Rosenblum propose a quinquennial system for election of directors, accompanied by a
number of other very important changes that make their proposal thoroughly remarkable. (More about this later.)
Let's back up. What's all the shouting about: Is our corporate governance system broken? And if it is broken, how so and
what needs to be done?
The orthodox view of corporate purpose is to maximize
profits for shareholders, with directors being elected, and management being appointed, to serve the interests of shareholders
with care, undivided loyalty and in compliance with law.
If we favor this orthodoxy-and I do-then we need to try
to restore it in those places where it has been, or is threatened to
be, removed. For example:
1. A number of states, twenty-nine at last count, that have
adopted the multiconstituency idea, by which state corporate
laws are revised to redefine a director's fiduciary duty as owed
not just to shareholders but, perhaps equally or even to a greater
extent, to many other constituencies affected by the corporation
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as well. The other constituencies typically mentioned include
employees, suppliers, customers, and communities in which the
corporation operates. There are various versions of the constituency amendment to state corporate statutes that define the duty
of directors. Most laws are permissive. Some expressly seek to
alter the orthodox notion that directors exclusively serve the interests of shareholders by elevating the many nonshareholder interests to equal status with shareholders' and according directors
wide discretion in weighing among them all. Others, such as one
enacted in New York in 1989, are ambiguous on the matter.
Some are limited in effect to takeover situations, thus revealing
more starkly their thwarting purpose; others apply generally to
all actions by directors.
2. In the ALI's embattled Corporate Governance Project,
the orthodox corporate objective of "profit maximization" has
been softened to "enhancing corporate profit and shareholder
gain," and even this softened standard is threatened with severe
erosion in the context of hostile takeovers. Section 6.02 of the
ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, in its most recent
draft version, would substitute for the rule of "corporate profit
and shareholder gain" a more flexible standard to govern the action of directors seeking to thwart anunfriendly bid. This standard would permit board action favoring nonshareholder constituencies at the expense of shareholders, so long as the long2
term interests of shareholders were not disfavored significantly.
3. The March 1990 Statement of the Business Roundtable
on Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness rejected "profit maximization" in favor of a careful weighing by
directors of the interests of all stakeholders (defined to include,
in addition to shareholders, a corporation's "employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the communities where the corporation
does business, and society as a whole").' The Roundtable suggests no tilting in favor of shareholders where conflicting interests arise. "Resolving the potentially differing interests of various stakeholders and the best long-term interest of the
corporation and its shareholders involves compromises and
2

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. ANALYSIS

& RECOMMENDATIONS TENTATIVE DRAFT No.10 §6.02 (Apr. 16, 1990).
1 The Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness
4 (March 1990), reprinted in 46 Bus. LAw. 241, 244 (1990).
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tradeoffs which often must be made rapidly. It is important that
all stakeholder interests be considered but impossible to assure
that all will be satisfied because competing claims may be mutually exclusive."'
Beyond the need to address these problems, and thus to restore the orthodoxy of profit maximization, there is a question of
the ways and means by which the interests of management and
directors are aligned with the interests of shareholders. How well
does our system of corporate governance work to assure that the
orthodox notion of corporate purpose is fulfilled? How effective
are the ways and means by which directors and management are
held accountable to shareholders? How has this system been affected by the excesses of the eighties? There are two issues here
and they are often confused with each other: (1) Is management
(the agent) serving itself rather than the corporation and its
shareholders (the principal)?-this is a matter of loyalty; and (2)
Is management, in seeking to serve the corporation and its
shareholders, acting in a stupid or otherwise incompetent
way?-this is a matter of care.
The role of directors is to see to it that management discharges its duties of loyalty and care. And, of course, directors
are equally subject to those duties. The use of outside directors
has become the dominant means by which public corporations
seek to assure shareholders that management is fulfilling these
duties.
Advocates of enhanced shareholder voice, such as CaPERS
and Professors Gilson, Kraakman and Dent, believe that: (1)
outside directors nominated by management (or even by a committee of outside directors) are so beholden to management as to
be incapable of holding management to account-of monitoring
management adequately; (2) the failure of outside directors, so
nominated, causes losses to shareholders that could be avoided;
and (3) the way to avoid those losses, or, put more positively, to
achieve shareholder gains, is to create machinery to assure that
institutional investors have their own nominees either on the
board or with regularized access to it.
I do not favor these ideas. None of the proposals would deal
with the threat to orthodoxy seen in the state constituency laws
I

Id. at 5, reprinted in 46 Bus. LAw. at 245.
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and the tendency that can be observed in the evolving drafts of
the ALI's project on corporate governance toward a more diffuse
set of corporate objectives.
In addition, the advocates of shareholder voice point to no
empirical data suggesting that large institutional shareholders, if
given the power to nominate, will produce directors better capable of maximizing shareholder gain than those now holding office. To my knowledge there are no such data. It is a particularly
dubious proposition when applied to the, government sector,
where almost all of the shareholder activism is found. There is
nothing about our governmental processes, or those in charge,
that should inspire confidence in their ability to improve on the
quality of directors now in office among our publicly held corporations. Moreover, those chosen to oversee government pension
funds are necessarily going to be influenced by a range of political considerations having little or nothing to do with the goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth. Political factors could easily become involved in the selection process.
With these concerns in mind, it is somewhat chilling to note
the confidence in result that CalPERS expresses in its letter to
the SEC seeking changes in the proxy rules to give it and other
large like-minded investors an easier means of imposing their
view on management, without (please note) the cost, or risk, of
acquiring control. The following is an excerpt of a letter, dated
November 3, 1989, from Richard H. Koppes, General Counsel to
CalPERS, to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the SEC's Division of
Corporation Finance, in which comprehensive review of the
proxy rules was requested and many proposed changes
advanced:
In contrast to shareholders that seek control of a company
through confrontation of directors and management and market
destabilization, the objective of ongoing institutional shareholders,
such as CalPERS, is to join in the dialogue of corporate governance
and thereby reduce volatility and increase long term share

values....
...As discussed above, however, there has developed a class of institutional investors that, by virtue of long term outlook and relative sophistication, is not only able to play a positive role in the governance
of public corporations but, as the owner of these corporations, has a
right to assert that role.

The very important issue presented by the CalPERS request to the SEC for proxy reform was succinctly stated in the
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letter, dated April 27, 1990, from the American Bar Association's
Section on Business Law to Linda C. Quinn, commenting on the
CaIPERS proposal:
The fundamental question thus presented is whether the proxy
rules and process require change to accommodate the relatively new

and important category of shareholder activity, namely, the desire to
influence management and the board of directors without directly
seeking control of the entire board through a proxy contest or through
a tender offer.
With some exceptions, the present system tends to allow an
investor, or group of investors acting in concert, to impose their
will on a corporation only after they have committed major resources to the tsk, either through purchasing voting control or
mounting a proxy contest for control of the board. There is a
rough correspondence between the power to direct and the capital risks undertaken to achieve that power. The CalPERS goal
appears to be aimed at empowerment without the risks that now
typically are involved.
But there is another problem. The shareholder voice proposals cluster around the notion that the largest institutional investors, who by dint of indexing hold the market, would collectively exercise a uniform voice in nominating and electing
"professional" directors to the boards of all the *corporations
that make up the market. The risk to entrepreneurship of having this group choose ineffective people is somewhat alarming,
especially when one considers the impact that getting it wrong
could have across a broad spectrum of publicly traded
corporations.
There is strength in a system that allows for a wide variety
of corporate governance structures and styles within a legal
framework that: (1) defines the corporate objective to be profit
maximization; (2) imposes on management and the board the
duties of loyalty and care; (3) encourages competition for managers, products and services, and capital; and (4) permits a market for control. Since no one with strong empirical support can
point to the optimal structure for achieving shareholder gain, it
is best to allow for diversity of approach to corporate governance, recognizing that entrepreneurship involves risk taking and
that investors can protect themselves from the risks of individual expressions of entrepreneurship, however experimental,
through intelligent diversification.
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The central problem with our present system of corporate
governance has been the loss of confidence on the part of shareholders in the willingness of even outside directors to act in the
shareholders' best interest when confronted with a threat to control, either through a hostile takeover bid or a proxy contest.
This loss of confidence is sometimes justified, but not because
outside directors act improperly. The problem is a structural
one: we have allowed state law (and the ALI project) to classify
outside directors, voting in such extreme circumstances, as "disinterested," therefore entitling them to the robust protections of
the business judgment rule. Much has been written about the
ability of outside directors to exercise business judgment unaffected by the possibility that management may be self-interested. William T. Allen, Chancellor of the Delaware Court of
Chancery and author of the chancery court's opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,5 reviews the matter
with a sensitive hand in his recent essay, Independent Directors
in MBO Transactions:Are They Fact or Fantasy?" Confessing
to "skepticism" but not the cynicism of such critics as Peter
Drucker and Judges Posner, Kaufman and Cudahy, Chancellor
Allen remains open to "the possibility that such committees [of
outside directors] can be employed effectively to protect corpo'7
rate and shareholder interests."
In my view, the business judgment rule was not intended for
such titanic occasions in corporate life as arise upon a threat to
control, and its use in contests for control has created much mischief. Thus, outside directors came to the assistance of management, supporting corporate and statutory defenses to hostile
takeover bids that became harder and harder to reconcile with
corporate profit and shareholder gain, notwithstanding their success before state legislatures and the courts. Institutional investors, particularly the large public pension funds, grew increasingly alarmed about the scope and effectiveness of these
defenses, and about the apparent success outside directors were
having in reconciling their support for management with their
duties of loyalty and care. And so they now are seeking a very
enhanced shareholder voice in the selection of directors.
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch.Jul. 26, 1989).
6 45 Bus. LAw 2055 (1990).
Id. at 2056.
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If one puts aside the role of directors in changes of control,
at the beginning of the eighties there was no problem with our
present system of corporate governance so fundamental as to require a major systemic change in the way directors are nominated and elected. No system will deter all of the excesses all of
the time. No system can, or should, prevent business failures,
which are the inevitable flip side of a competitive environment
in which businesses are allowed to succeed. Unfortunately, the
excesses of the eighties leave us with a legacy of problems that
threaten to change the orthodox view of corporate purpose. The
problem with proposals for enhanced shareholder voice is that
they would introduce uncertainties into the process by which directors are selected while not dealing directly with the legacy of
those excesses from the eighties.
As mentioned earlier, Marty Lipton and Steve Rosenblum
propose a new system of corporate governance based on a quinquennial election of directors. 8 What is intriguing about this
proposal is that it would sweep away all of the excesses left untouched by the other proponents for change. Here are the essential elements of the Lipton-Rosenblum proposal:
1. Directors, of whom a majority must be outside, would be
elected for five-year terms, subject to earlier removal only for
"cause."
2. Nonconsensual takeovers would be prohibited. No shareholder could acquire more than 10 percent of a corporation's
stock without board approval.
3. In connection with the quinquennial meeting, a shareholder or group of shareholders with 5 percent or more of the
corporation's stock, or stock worth $5 million or more, would
have access to the corporate proxy machinery in support of its
candidates for the board on the same basis that the incumbent
board enjoys in support of itself.
4. The incumbent board would be required to develop detailed strategic five-year plans and, in connection with each
quinquennial meeting, would deliver a detailed report to shareholders as to its actual performance over the past five years
compared to its five-year plan and as to its strategic plan for the
next five years. An investment banking or similar firm would do
8 Lipton & Rosenblum, A Proposal for a New System of Corporate Governance:
The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHL L. Rov. 187 (1991).
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a separate evaluation report to shareholders.
5. All existing impediments to takeovers would be eliminated, including, for example, poison pills, staggered boards,
super majority "fair price" provisions, state takeover statutes
and nonstockholder constituency laws.
6. The "one share, one vote" provisions of Rule 19c-4 under
the Securities Exchange Act would be affirmed.
7. An incentive compensation system, based solely on
whether and to what extent the corporation met its five-year
goals, would be imposed in place of other types of incentives.
This proposal, taken in its totality, is a breathtaking effort
to! (1) affirm the corporate orthodoxy of profit maximization; (2)
put teeth in such policing mechanisms as the right of shareholders to elect the board and the duty of the board to monitor management; (3) encourage managers, directors and shareholders to
develop a longer term perspective, measured in five-year plans;
and (4 facilitate a market for corporate control, albeit periodically, every five years, by sweeping away all of the defensive barriers so carefully constructed by management over the past decade to thwart hostile attempts to gain control.
Some might be surprised to find Mr. Lipton, architect of so
many of these defenses, proposing their total abandonment in
exchange for a five-year wait on contests for control. Lipton and
Rosenblum argue that, under their scheme, "institutional shareholders would have no choice but to take at least a five-year perspective"' and to look to the long-term return on their investment. I confess to being surprised by the Lipton-Rosenblum
proposal. But I am delighted too, because what Messrs. Lipton
and Rosenblum have put forward is a very creative way to erase
the excesses of the eighties in one grand sweep. Moreover, their
proposal strengthens the traditional methods by which the interests of managers and directors are aligned with those of
shareholders.
I have some doubt that the quinquennial system would, in
fact, encourage a long-term outlook on the part of management
more effectively than what currently exists. In fact, five years is
not very long. And the sharp focus on performance against a
five-year plan may deter entrepreneurship unduly by making
9 Id. at 243.
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management too risk averse. However, I am inclined, after one
look, to accept the trade-off proposed by the authors. In effect,
by barring all defensive maneuvers to defeat a hostile takeover
attempt, the authors are espousing the central principle of the
English system now administered by the Panel on Takeovers
and Mergers, namely that management of a defending company
should take no frustrating action without the consent of
shareholders.
There are, of course, political problems in achieving the
clean sweep being advocated, because matters of state and federal law are implicated. But for purposes of debate, the practical
problems of implementation can be put aside.
In their paper, some 142 pages in length, the authors devote
exactly half the space to arguments against much of the current
thinking by academics in regard to corporate governance and to
trying to prove that institutional investors have a short-term focus that has caused short-termism among corporate managers
and led to the hostile takeover phenomenon of the eighties.
What is remarkable about the conclusions advanced in this, the
first half of the paper-conclusions, I believe, that rest more on
personal perceptions than on solid findings of fact-is that they
prepare one not at all for the quinquennial system put forth in
the second half of the paper. The authors' proposal comes as
something of a non sequitur. But a non sequitur most welcome!
For this small observation in no way diminishes my admiration
for the sweep and thrust of the proposal itself. More power to
Messrs. Lipton and Rosenblum in carrying forward their ideas.
They deserve to be taken very seriously indeed.
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